Energy de-escalation

The truce in Yemen is a historic moment for the Middle East (or so it seems)

The agreement announced by the UN will last two months and can give a minimum of stability to the region. It is also an opportunity for Italy, which must be able to identify the right interlocutors among those involved in the construction of peace. But stability may soon be threatened by new food crises due to Putin’s war.

In addition to the war in Ukraine, which, due to its geographical proximity and atrocities, has overwhelmingly occupied the media scene, the international scene is marked by numerous conflicts. Of these, the seven-year-old Yemeni population is undoubtedly one of the most dramatic in both humanitarian and economic terms.

Last April 3, coinciding with the first day of Ramadan, a temporary truce of two months was reached. The agreement, announced by the UN is the result of three intense days of talks between the parties held in Riyadh where, In addition to the truce, the possibility has been agreed for refuelling vessels to be able to deliver fuel in the ports of Hudaydah and for commercial flights to operate inside and outside Sanaa airport, provided that the destinations are predetermined and remain within the regional framework.

The truce mediated by the United Nations is the result of the intensification of the activity put in place by US diplomacy and comes at a time when the "oil diplomacy" is in parallel - to borrow the comment by Federico Fubini published on 3 April in Corriere della Sera - triggered by the Russian Ukrainian conflict.

The Ukrainian escalation has placed Iran in a position of strength that allows it to determine the supply of crude oil on world markets on which, in fact, also depends the price that, if it is not calmed, as Fubini points out, It would risk jeopardising Biden’s mid-term election altogether.

From this it is easy to understand that the acceleration of the agreement on nuclear power, with the meetings on the JCPOA, aims to achieve as a counter-match the increase in the market of barrels of Iranian crude oil. It should also be added that for months now there has been a negotiating table between Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed at restoring regional structures, starting precisely from the issue of Iranian nuclear power and the Yemeni war.

The latter, in particular, represents the greatest stumbling block that has so far prevented the parties from reaching a rapprochement.

This distance is essentially dictated by different strategic needs since while Theran aims to expand its influence in the Gulf area, Riyadh is driven by a desire to preserve its leadership, but also to acquire greater degrees of strategic autonomy than the United States that can also facilitate the interlocution with Iran on the main focus of the area.

In late March, a few days before the truce was reached, the Houthi, one of the parties to the Yemeni conflict, launched into Jeddah via drones, some missiles hitting the Aramco site located near both the Abdulaziz airport and the automobile circuit.

This was not an isolated attack. Previously, a water storage and distribution centre belonging to the National Water Company and, at the same time, the Royal Saudi Defense Forces (RSADF) had been hit in Samtah, near the Yemeni borders had intercepted and destroyed armed drones near the southern borders with Yemen, where attacks are repeated frequently.

The attack on Jeddah, in addition to having an impact on oil prices, already affected by the Ukrainian conflict, came at a time when negotiations were being held in Vienna between the promoters of the JCPOA and Iran, which, within this context, plays a prominent role due to the close proximity to the Houthis.

The latter, in fact, although they do not belong to the axis of resistance, however, they receive important support from Iran, both in economic and military terms, that is allowing them to proceed in the conflict.

Given the coincidence in time and the oil site hit, it is not peregrine to assume that the action was to be interpreted as a warning addressed to the negotiators in Vienna.

The military presence of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen should not be forgotten.

This presence highlights the importance of the control of the Yemeni territorial waters and the Babel-Mandeb Strait, which represent a fundamental passage of the maritime routes to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, and fifteen international submarine cables.

Therefore, the control of this passage, which will become increasingly strategic in the years to come, takes on a value far greater than the hundreds of billions of dollars spent on armaments in the last seven years and already partially amortized.

Abu Dhabi, in fact, as Cinzia Bianco on Limes points out, thanks to the advice of high-ranking strategists, such as the former MI6 executive Will Tricks, has already been able to establish itself in the country’s strategic places of interest.

These include the port city of Mocha, Mukalla Airport, the port of Aden, as well as the island of Socotra in the Indian Ocean.

It should be noted, however, that the latter, because of its strategic importance, takes on hegemonic connotations that come into conflict with the posture of Saudi Arabia, which also would be the leader of the military coalition engaged in Yemen, mainly concentrated in the defense of the northern border and counterbalancing Iranian military influence.

Faced with these scenarios, it is therefore possible to imagine that in the new geopolitical context being defined, the Yemeni truce can be interpreted as a point of de-escalation among the actors in the field.

Moreover, from a safety point of view, this situation is an important element within an area, such as that of the Red Sea and the Strait of Babel Mandeb, both strategic because of the copious flows of goods that from the east point to the Mediterranean and European ports, as fragile for the numerous conflicts and weak States present on its coasts.

Think also of the presence of groups affiliated to the Al-Qaeda network and radical Islamist organizations that are taking on more and more strength in the Sinai area, to the point of controlling part of the territory. Such chokepoint, crossed by 40% of our commercial interchange with Asia, is of high strategic value for the economic security of our Country and our enterprises.

This would justify our military base, along with that of the major powers, in Djibouti.

It is, therefore, objective that both areas of this sea, the south and the north, because of the privileged geographical position, can easily induce these groups to plan military actions to block Suez and thus the entire basin of trade between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

While the ceasefire in Yemen could be an important signal, we must not lose sight of securing the rest of the area in question, whereas stability could also be threatened by new food crises resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Suffice it to say that Egypt and Yemen are 80% and 50% dependent respectively on imports of Russian and Ukrainian wheat.

Therefore, this represents an equally urgent and at the same time arduous challenge in which Italy, must be able to identify the right interlocutors between those interested in the construction of a Mediterranean and a united Near East, to ensure peace and economic prosperity, on which the security of our businesses also depends.

by Filippo Romeo, Think Tank Secursat